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I. WHAT IS IT?
T HE doctrine of assumed risk, as it has come to be understood in
most jurisdictions, embodies two separate concepts.' First,
assumed risk is thought of as negativing the duty owed by the defend-
ant to the plaintiff, particularly the duty of an owner-occupier to
persons coming upon his premises. In Texas this concept is referred
to as no duty. At early common law, a landowner owed very little
duty to persons coming on his land. He was required to warn of
hidden dangers so that the invitee could stay off the premises or take
precautions to protect himself. As will be hereinafter discussed, when
the landowner had taken this step, he had discharged his duty,
and the invitee proceeded at his own risk. Being under no fur-
ther duty to the plaintiff, the landowner was not liable to the plain-
tiff for injuries which occurred. Used in this sense, assumption of
risk is but the negative of duty. When the landowner owed the
invitee no duty, or had discharged whatever duty he had, the plain-
tiff could not recover even though he was found to have acted
reasonably in encountering the risk.' Sometimes the no duty concept
is referred to as a defense. Actually, the plaintiff must show the
existence of a duty and its breach.' As a consequence, the no duty
*This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury
Litigation, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, November 12, 1965. The writer
gratefully acknowledges the valuable collaboration and research assistance of John W. Bickle,
Associate Editor of the Southwestern Law Journal.
** Justice, Texas Supreme Court, 1957 to present; B.A., B.B.A., LL.B., University of
Texas.
1 While legal scholars differ, it is generally accepted that assumed risk has at least two
separate meanings. For example, see James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952),
dividing the use of assumed risk into a primary and a secondary sense. See also Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961), recognizing the ex-
istence of two separate meanings. However, see Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA.
L. REV. 77 (1961), stating that assumed risk is but the negative of duty. See also Keeton,
Assumption of Product Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965), indicating that the subject of assumed
risk may be illusory. He also exhorts the courts to resist the temptation to give different
substantive or procedural effects to the two theories which he considers to be in essence one
and the same defense. Dean Prosser, however, would divide assumed risk into three categories,
i.e., express consent, implied consent and voluntarily encountering a known dangerous condi-
tion. See PROssER, TORTS 450-51 (3d ed. 1964).
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1963) (owner-occupier
gave invitee a warning as to the dangerous condition).
'See Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 111, 116 (1964); and RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 580-81, comment b. (1965).
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rule is a part of the plaintiff's case and is not strictly speaking a
defense.'
Second, assumed risk acts to deny recovery to a plaintiff for injuries
received either on or off the premises of an owner-occupier, when the
plaintiff, with knowledge and appreciation of the danger, voluntarily
encounters the risk. In Texas this concept is labeled volenti non fit
injuria. In its application the plaintiff is said to assume the risk when
he deliberately chooses to encounter a risk created by the defendant's
breach of duty toward him. The doctrine embodies the element of
an intelligent choice' and presupposes the existence of a duty.6 Used
in this sense, assumed risk is a pure defense, i.e., based on actual or
implied consent, and requires knowledge and appreciation of the
particular danger and a voluntary exposure to it. Thus, the burden
of pleading, proof and submission of issues is upon the defendant.7
II. ORIGIN, BACKGROUND AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT
The English view of contributory negligence was that such negli-
gence intervened and prevented the defendant's primary negligence
from being the proximate cause of the injury. The doctrine of
assumed risk was a part of the defense of contributory negligence in
4Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963). See also note 7
in fra.
'Wood v. Kane Boilerworks, Inc., 150 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952). The
inquiry is not why the invitee chose to incur the risk, but only whether he knew of
the risk and made a voluntary choice. See Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863
(1961) (plaintiff did not know that salt water pits would pollute fresh water); Dee v.
Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S.W.2d 449 (1959) (twelve-year-old child with little riding
experience did not realize danger in urging horse to go faster in an area outside of defendant's
premises); Triangle Motors v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953) (plaintiff
did not know elevator was on the floor above him and would strike him when it descended) ;
Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952) (plaintiff knew that the driver was
drunk and thus was charged with appreciation of the danger); Wood v. Kane Boilerworks,
Inc., supra (plaintiff did not know of the particular latent defect in a pipe which exploded);
and Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508 (1897)
(employee thought another workman was to help him lift a heavy load). However, for an
exception to this principle see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Winder, 340 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) error ref. (invitee motivated to incur the risk by a humanitarian or rescue impulse).
'Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Rooks, 293 S.W. 554, 557 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927) (pas-
senger injured in getting off of train); Pappas v. Wright, 171 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943) (collision between automobile and named defendant's truck).
'Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963). In this regard see
James, note 1 supra, at 167; Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious
Conditions-SPecial Issue Submission in Texas, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1954); Kronzer, Special
Issue Submission in Causes Involving "Premises Defects" and Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 2
Hous. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964); McGregor, Incurred Risk in Texas, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 410,
416 (1949); SUTTON, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS, PERSON-
AL INJURY LITIGATION IN TEXAS 519, 523 (1961); Comment, Submission of Special Issues
in Slip and Fall Cases, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 161, 164-65 (1953); and Comment, Open and
Obvious Dangers in Slip and Fall Cases, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 176, 183 (1953). The citation
of these excellent articles does not mean, of course, that the author agrees with all that is
said in them. They are cited primarily for their scholarly treatment of the problem.
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the early cases.' Assumed risk came to have an independent status
only as recently as 1820.' The doctrine arose from the common law
philosophy which held paramount the freedom of the individual.
Each individual was left free to do what he chose and was expected
to protect himself. In the law of torts at least the idea of any obliga-
tion to protect others was abnormal. The same concept was used with
respect to the rescue doctrine, i.e., rescue was considered to be an
extravagance, and the rescuer generally was held to have assumed
the risk of his good samaritanism.
The duty to protect arose in time with relation to public pursuits,
such as carriers, innkeepers and the like.1" So when an owner of public
facilities permitted another to come on his premises, or even invited
him, he was held bound to warn of any known defects not obvious
to his guest. Throughout this development, however, it was an excep-
tional situation which required the landowner to do more than to
warn of dangers and thus enable the invitee to protect himself.11
A. Basic English Cases
The assumed risk doctrine arose from two distinct legal relation-
ships-those involving the duty of the occupier of the land or prem-
ises, and those involving a master and servant relationship. The
origin of the doctrine as applied to an occupier of land is considered
to be the case of Ilott v. Wilkes."2 There a trespasser, while hunting
in the defendant's woods was injured by a concealed spring gun.
Signs indicated the presence of the guns, and a companion of the
plaintiff had told him about their existence, but the plaintiff did not
know where they were located. A safe path had been provided
through the woods, but the plaintiff did not use it. Plaintiff tripped
a hidden wire attached to a gun and was injured. The court, in deny-
ing a recovery to the plaintiff, wrote, "The maxim of law, volenti
non fit injuria, applies; for he voluntarily exposed himself to the
mischief which has happened."23 Thus, the concept of assumed risk
as a bar to recovery, without regard to negligence, was born. A read-
ing of the opinion also discloses an underlying policy to protect the
landowner and his game."
'For an excellent analysis of this history see Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions
of Negligence, 8 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1895). See also Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of
Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14 (1906); Gow, The Defense of Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 61
JURiD. REV. 37 (Eng. 1949); POLLOCK, TORTS 112 (15th ed. 1951).
9Supra, note 8. See also Ilott v. Wilkes, 106 Eng. Rep. 674 (1820).
10 See Bohlen, note 8 supra, and PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 450-69 (3d ed. 1964).
"' See notes 8-9 supra.
12 106 Eng. Rep. 674 (1820).
13 106 Eng. Rep. at 677.
14 106 Eng. Rep. at 680.
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Later in Priestley v. Fowler" the volenti theory was extended to
the master and servant relationship. The plaintiff in that case was a
butcher in the defendant's employ. The defendant directed that a
wagon be loaded with meat and told the plaintiff to accompany the
delivery. The wagon was overloaded and broke down, causing injury
to the plaintiff. In its holding for the master the court stated that the
servant must (should) have known" of the danger and assumed it.
The court said,
The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master,
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably
apprehends injury to himself .... [T]he plaintiff must have known as
well as his master, and probably better, whether the van was sufficient,
whether it was overloaded."
As a consequence, the doctrine was extended to the point of charging
the plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved.
While the English courts had enunciated the volenti non fit injuria
doctrine in Ilott v. Wilkes,' discussed above, the court of appeals
had yet to set out the no duty doctrine. It did so in Thomas v. Quar-
termaine," an action for damages under the Employers Liability Act
of 1880 for injuries received by the plaintiff, a brewery worker. The
brewery had a boiling vat and a cooling vat in the same room, with
a walkway in between. Beneath the boiling vat was a board which
plaintiff needed to use as part of the cover for the cooling vat. The
board was difficult to dislodge. Plaintiff pulled hard on it, and it sud-
denly came loose. As it did so, the plaintiff fell backward into the
cooling vat and was severely injured. Since the plaintiff had knowl-
edge of the risks involved and nevertheless proceeded to encounter
them, he was held to have assumed the risk.' The court enunciated the
basis for the assumed risk doctrine when it wrote,
The duty of an occupier of premises which have an element of danger
upon them reaches its vanishing point in the case of those who are cog-
nisant of the full extent of the danger, and voluntarily run the risk.
Volenti non fit injuria."
The case formed the foundation for the later assumed risk deci-
15 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
1 "Compare this should have known test with Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
17 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33 (1837).
18 106 Eng. Rep. 674 (1820).
19 18 Q.B.D. 685 (Ct. of App. 1887).
"°In interpreting the Employers Liability Act of 1880, the court said, "The true view
in my opinion is that the Act, with certain exceptions, has placed the workman in a position
as advantageous as but no better than the rest of the world who use the master's premises
at his invitation on business." 18 Q.B.D. 685, 693 (Ct. of App. 1887).
21 18 Q.B.D. at 695.
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sions.2" It should be noted that, while earlier decisions were based
upon knowledge and appreciation which the plaintiff should have
had, Thomas v. Quartermaine emphasized the actual knowledge and
appreciation of the plaintiff and his voluntary exposure to the danger.
Before examining the development of assumed risk in America,
two other leading English cases should be noted to further illustrate
the doctrine there-Smith v. Chas. Baker &4 Sons" and London Grav-
ing Dock Co. v. Horton."' In Smith the plaintiff was employed to
drill holes in a rock near an overhead crane operated by the defend-
ant's employee. The crane lifted stones and at times swung them over
the plaintiff's head. The plaintiff was generally aware of the danger
involved, having worked in the area for several months. He was
injured when a stone was negligently dropped from the crane. The
plaintiff admitted that he generally knew the risk, i.e., he knew that,
from time to time, stones were being lifted over him. On such occa-
sions his usual practice was to move until the stones passed overhead.
At this particular time, however, he did not see the crane or know
that it had moved, and no warning was given. In holding for the
plaintiff, the court indicated that knowledge of the danger was not
enough; there must also be appreciation of the particular danger."5
The court pointed out that the (English) doctrine is volenti non fit
injuria, which requires both knowledge and full appreciation, rather
than scienti non fit injuria, requiring only knowledge.
In Horton, a workman slipped and fell while working on a defec-
tive scaffold in the hold of a ship. The plaintiff, a welder, was
employed by a subcontractor to weld steel strips on a trawler being
repaired by defendant, the main contractor. In order to get from one
board of the scaffold to another, the plaintiff had to step on a defec-
tive iron beam. He had complained of this defect to the defendant's
foreman, who assured him that it would be remedied. However,
before it was the plaintiff slipped and fell and was injured. Notwith-
standing the lack of contributory negligence, assumed risk was held
to be a defense since the workman, with full knowledge and appreci-
ation of the risk, still undertook it. Again scienti or mere knowledge
was not enough; volenti or full appreciation was required."
B. Development In The United States
The early American assumed risk cases, generally speaking, were
" See cases cited notes 80 and 82 infra.
2'A. C. 325 (1891).
242 All E.R. 1 (1951).
2'A.C. 325, 337 (1891).
2 "In other words, it must be shown that he was volens within the meaning applied to
that word in the phrase volenti non fit injuria .. " 2 All E.R. 1, 4 (1951).
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grounded in the above line of English precedents, i.e., the Ilott,
Priestley, and Thomas cases." The various courts in our country
developed our case law from this beginning. In fact, the requirements
of knowledge and appreciation of the risk along with voluntary expo-
sure form the basis of most American decisions. Many of the early
American cases developed in the master and servant area. It is worthy
of note that our courts inherited the concept of extreme individual-
ism of the early industrial revolution. Justices Black and Frank-
furter traced the doctrine of assumed risk, as the phrase is used in
employer-employee relations, in separate opinions in Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co.28 The holding in that case was that Congress in-
tended to abolish assumed risk in Federal Employer Liability Act
cases. Mr. Justice Black said:
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in
response to the general impulse of common law courts . . . to insulate
the employer as much as possible from bearing the "human overhead"
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone--of the doing of
industrialized business. The general purpose . . . seems to have been to
give maximum freedom to expanding industry."
The holdings of the courts on assumed risk resulted in statutes
in almost all jurisdictions abolishing the defense of assumed risk in
workmen's compensation cases."0 As stated in the Tiller case, above,
one of the purposes of such laws is to put the cost of injury, not-
withstanding any assumption of risk, on the employer, which cost is
then shifted to the public. The cost of human injury and death is
thus made a part of the cost of the item or services produced. 1
As indicated, most assumed risk cases fall into two categories,
each having a separate historical background and each having differ-
ent legal criteria. The remainder of this Article will be devoted to
an analysis of the two separate situations. We will specifically con-
sider (1) the duty, or lack of duty, of an owner-occupier to people
coming on his land or premises and (2) other situations where the
defendant has created, or is responsible for, an unreasonable risk of
danger, the plaintiff voluntarily encountering or subjecting himself
to the danger. The basic analysis will consist of appropriate Texas
27 See Gow, The Defense of Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 61 Jurid. Rev. 37 (Eng. 1949).
See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1162-93 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 450-69 (3d ed. 1964).
28 318 U.S. 54 (1943).29 1d. at 58-59.
30See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 1(3) (1956). The federal govern-
ment has likewise abolished assumed risk in railroad employee accident cases, 53 Star. 1404
(1939); and in cases involving seamen, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920).
3' 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
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law concepts, but other jurisdictions will be considered where par-
ticularly descriptive.
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSUMED RISK ON PREMISES
A. Trespassers, Licensees And Invitees-
In General
At early common law, and particularly since the Ilott case dis-
cussed above, the owner-occupier of land held a favored position."
Outsiders were not free to come on his land. Primarily because of
this situation, there developed degrees of duty owed by the owner-
occupier to people coming on the land. The varying duties are
thoroughly discussed by the authorities cited in the footnotes accom-
panying this section. The following discussion is based primarily on
their conclusions.
As to trespassers, the owner-occupier has only the slightest obli-
gation. There is no duty to warn or to keep the land in a reasonably
safe condition for a trespasser." This rule is subject to certain excep-
tions which arise after the trespasser has been discovered. 4 The duty
to licensees is slightly amplified. The owner-occupier is obligated to
warn the licensee of any dangerous condition or activity within his
knowledge, but is under no obligation to see that the premises are
made safe for the licensee's use." Thus, generally speaking, the licensee
takes the premises as he finds them; there is no duty to inspect or to
use ordinary care to make the premises safe. While these rules have
not been subject to exceptions, several mitigating tendencies have
been developed. There is a present-day tendency in many courts
throughout the United States to remove people coming on premises
from the bare licensee category and to find their legal relationship to
be that of an invitee. This has especially been so in areas where uniden-
tified segments of the public are involved, i.e., outside of the home
and especially in business establishments people are more readily
3 ,The landowner has been a favorite of the law. According to Blackstone the right of
private ownership of property was one of the three absolute rights of English law. The
law's regard for this right was so great that it would 'not authorize the least violation of
it. . . .even for the general good of the whole community.' " Note, 42 N. C. L. REV. 960,
965 (1964), quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138 (1807). See also Keeton, Assump-
tion of Risk and the Landowner, note 1 supra, and Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the
Landowner, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 562 (1942).
3 See PROSSER, TORTS 364-85 (3d ed. 1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1435-70
(1956). See also Eldridge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32 (1937); and
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144
(1953).34 Ibid.
"SSee PROSSER, TORTS 385-94 (3d ed. 1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1470-78
(1956). See also James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and
Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954).
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classed as invitees. There also has been a tendency to enlarge the con-
cept of what is considered a concealed defect or condition.
A higher duty of care is owed to an invitee. Generally, the owner-
occupier must exercise ordinary care to make the premises safe or
to warn the invitee of any dangerous condition or activity within his
knowledge or which he could discover with reasonable diligence."
But in states which adhere to the assumed risk doctrine, the invitee is
still regarded as being on the land merely at the invitation of the
owner-occupier. The owner-occupier is not an insurer of the invitee's
safety. The invitee can decide whether to come on or stay off. Thus if
the property is patently dangerous, the invitee has a choice of either
staying away or taking the property as he finds it and protecting
himself from the danger if he can. The owner-occupier continues to
have his obligation to warn of any hidden defects.
Some courts of this country are applying different rules to differ-
ent sorts of invitees. They make a distinction between business and
social invitees. While the ordinary rules are applied to social guests,"7
there is a tendency to impose a more severe obligation on the owner-
occupier with respect to a business invitee than is said to be owed to
a social invitee. In the ordinary invitee situation a warning of a dan-
ger discharges the defendant's duty.a" Some courts are now saying that
at least as to business guests, a simple warning such as "walk care-
fully" is not enough. The warning area is developing rather rapidly
and will be further discussed under a subsequent section.
B. Duty Of Owner-Occupier In Texas
Because of its importance in the development of assumed risk,
our analysis is confined to the duty owed to an invitee. In Texas the
owner-occupier has, as to invitees, a duty to exercise ordinary care to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn."9 The
duty has been further extended to require that the owner-occupier
exercise ordinary care to inspect his premises for defects.' The test
applied to determine the owner-occupier's duty is an objective one,
i.e., he is responsible if he knew, or as an ordinary prudent person
" Halepeska v. Callihan Interest, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (Tex. 1963). See James,
note 35 supra and Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
See also PROSSER, TORTS 394-408 (3d ed. 1964); and 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1478-1505
(1956).
372 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1181 (1956). See also Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230,
196 N.E. 36 (1935) (guest in automobile assumed the risk of unknown defects); and
Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930) (same).
3'2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1179-84 (1956).
a Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d 543 (1962) (child injured when
glass broke in attempt to open door); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425
(1950) (timbers removed and tarpaulin merely covered a hole in the ground).
40 See cases cited note 39 supra.
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should have known, of the dangerous condition. It has been said that
this duty is based on the owner-occupier's superior knowledge of the
premises, or the knowledge which a reasonably prudent man should
have of his premises.' If the dangerous conditions are not open and
obvious, the owner-occupier is under a duty to exercise ordinary care
in warning the invitee of the danger.4 In those cases in which the
warning has been communicated, the duty was found to have been
discharged."3 The function of the warning is to give the invitee
knowledge of, and an opportunity to appreciate, the danger."
Several difficult problems remain as to the adequacy of the warn-
ing to discharge the owner-occupier's duty. The problems involve
not only the giving of the warning but the receiving and compre-
hension of it. Is it sufficient to give a warning, or must it also be
found that the invitee received and comprehended it? In Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell,' the jury found that Campbell had
been warned of the floor's slippery condition and that he had failed
to heed the warning. These findings implied that the warning had
been communicated to him. In the English case of Ilott v. Wilkes"
there was a general "to whom it may concern" sign which plaintiff
did not see, although he had been given some warning of spring-gun
hazards by his companion. It is reasonable to assume that cases will
arise concerning the sufficiency of the warning and its comprehen-
sion by the person warned. Our court has recently granted a writ of
error in a case involving a warning to a five-year-old child.47 In
these cases the court will probably be urged to balance the adequacy
of the warning against the capacity of the person receiving it, e.g.,
a sign is of no value to an invitee who cannot read."
4' Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950) (a step-down on
the other side of a door); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950) (a
tarpaulin covering timbers stored in a hole in the floor); Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers,
137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941) (a step-down from a raised platform at a soda
fountain); Camp v. J. H. Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error
ref. n.r.e. (a terrazzo floor which became slick when wet); Marshall v. San Jacinto Bldg.,
Inc., 67 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref. (slight rise from a sidewalk to build-
ing entrance). See also Keeton, Assumption of Risk and The Landowner, note 1 supra. The
Renfro Drug Co. and Walgreen-Texas Co. cases were not treated as assumed risk cases but
instead were disposed of on grounds of negligence and contributory negligence.
4 Ellis v. Moore, - S.W.2d - (Tex. 1966) (duty to warn of danger in the operation
of defective tractor); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964)
(duty to warn of slick floors).
4 5 Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, note 42 supra (owner-occupier warned invitee
of dangerously slick floors).
"Ellis v. Moore, - S.W.2d - (Tex. 1966).
45373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964).
4106 Eng. Rep. 674 (1820).
47 McClary v. Jones, - S.W.2d - (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) writ granted, - S.W.2d
-_ (Tex. 1966).
"Holmes v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 378 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) resld on
other grounds, 382 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1964).
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Although logically it also goes to the matter of sufficiency, the
question to whom warning need be given presents a slightly different
but equally difficult situation. This is regarded as an unsettled area.
For example, in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bivins" an employee of an independ-
ent contractor hired by the lessee was injured in a gas explosion while
working on the well. Gulf had warned both the contractor and the
crew chief for whom the plaintiff worked of the possibility that the
well might be affected by certain iron sulphide deposits which created
a hazardous condition. The warning was never directly communica-
ted to the plaintiff who was injured. The majority of the Fifth Circuit
held that the lessee had a duty to warn the employee of the contractor
but had discharged that duty by warning both the contractor and
the foreman. Judge Brown, however, dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part, said that the rule should be based upon reasonableness.
He stated that the rule should be whether, in each particular case, a
prudent occupier in the position of the defendant would reasonably
have concluded that the particular warning would in all likelihood
be brought home to an employee who might otherwise be ignorant
of the danger." This is, in effect, the way the Restatement of Torts
(Second) expresses the proposition."1 The plaintiff, however, received
no warning. Thus it could be, and was, forcefully argued that the
plaintiff could not have assumed a risk of which he had no knowl-
edge."
C. Duty Of Invitee In Texas
In Texas the invitee is under no duty to inspect the premises."
He may assume that the premises are in good condition. The common
law rule denying recovery based on the invitee's constructive knowl-
edge has been altered. The invitee must either have actual knowledge
and appreciation of the danger 4 or the danger must be open and
obvious before he will be held to have assumed the risk. 5
49276 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Tyler v. McDaniel, 386 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. (warning to crew chief held to discharge duty to warn
employee).
"0 276 F.2d at 764.
51RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 215-16 (1965).
" 276 F.2d at 757.
"Peck v. Peck, 99 Tex. 10, 87 S.W. 248 (1905). See also BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE
LAW OF TORTS 184 (1926).
54 At common law, the invitee was denied recovery and held responsible if he should
have known and apprecialed the danger. This concept was expressed in the early English case
of Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837). It was deliberately repudiated in Texas
in Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
"SHouston National Bank v. Adair, 146 Tex. 387, 207 S.W.2d 374 (1948) (worn stairs
and no handrail); A. C. Burton Co., Inc. v. Stasny, 223 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
error ref. (glass window next to a door); Hausman Packing Co. v. Badwey, 147 S.W.2d
856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. (slippery floor in refrigerated meat truck); Marshall
v. San Jacinto Bldg., Inc., 67 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref. (slight rise from
sidewalk to building entrance).
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The test applied to determine the invitee's knowledge is a sub-
jective one, i.e., whether the particular individual had knowledge of
the danger and appreciated the risk involved. Two cases are important
in the development of the actual knowledge requirement-Robert
E. McKee, General Contractor, Inc. v. Patterson" and Halepeska v.
Callihan Interests, Inc." In McKee, the plaintiff (Patterson) was an
employee of a subcontractor hired to install bleachers in a gymnasium.
Another subcontractor had been hired to finish the floors. The floor
people finished their work before Patterson's work was completed.
The ladder on which the plaintiff was working slipped on the slick
floor, and he was injured. The plaintiff sued McKee, the general con-
tractor. The evidence showed that the plaintiff actually knew of and
appreciated the danger. However, the court indicated that the plain-
tiff could not recover if he either knew of the condition and appre-
ciated the danger or should have known and appreciated the
danger. The court further stated that a plaintiff could be
charged with knowledge as a matter of law if the danger were open
and obvious but indicated that, in some situations, whether the plain-
tiff should have known was a fact question. In Halepeska the court
reconsidered the "should have known and appreciated" test. The jury
had found that while Halepeska should have known and apprecia-
ted the danger, he did not actually have such knowledge and appre-
ciation. The court of civil appeals had reversed a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, holding that actual knowledge is not required so long as
the plaintiff should have known of the danger. Our court held that
assumed risk requires a finding that the invitee have actual knowl-
edge and appreciation of the danger or be charged with such knowl-
edge and appreciation as a matter of law. The court narrowed the
factual inquiries to actual knowledge and appreciation as distin-
guished from constructive knowledge.
Whether the plaintiff, as a prudent person, should have known
and should have appreciated the dangers were said to be proper
issues only of contributory negligence, to be followed by issues of
proximate cause. In Halepeska, even assuming that these "should
have known" issues could have supported a finding of negligence,
there were no findings establishing proximate cause so as to bar the
plaintiff from recovery. Since the trial court entered judgment for
the plaintiff, the presumed findings were that the acts were not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
It is not sufficient that the plaintiff have knowledge that there is
58153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
"7Halepeska, 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
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some danger in the particular undertaking. He must have knowledge
of the particular risk which leads to his injury."s In Triangle Motors
v. Richmond5 the plaintiff, a plumber, had been employed to make
repairs on several floors of a building. On the first day, he was taken
to the second floor in an elevator. The next day he walked up to the
second floor. Having forgotten some tools, he leaned over the open
elevator shaft and shouted down to his helper. There was no guard
rail on the elevator shaft, and the plaintiff was struck by the descend-
ing elevator. He had taken steps to avoid falling down the shaft, but
did not expect the elevator to come from above. The court refused
to charge the plaintiff with knowledge stating that volenti applies
only when the plaintiff, with full knowledge and appreciation of the
danger, incurs the risk as the result of an intelligent choice." The
plaintiff there did not know of the particular risk or appreciate the
particular danger which created his injury. He did know and appre-
ciate the risk of falling down the unguarded elevator shaft but not
of the danger which caused his injury.
As previously mentioned, in some situations the plaintiff will be
charged with knowledge," or appreciation, or both. Although the
invitee may assume that the premises are in a safe condition, he may
not close his eyes to obvious dangers. Charging the plaintiff with
knowledge and appreciation occurs primarily in those situations in
which the danger is either open and obvious or when the plaintiff has
repeatedly been exposed to it."'
The question then arises as to when and to whom the danger is
" This inquiry is also very important in the cases involving injuries to spectators at
sporting events. For example, see Lee v. National League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, Inc.,
4 Wis. 2d 168, 89 N.W.2d 811 (1958) (assumed risk did not apply where elderly lady
plaintiff, who had purchased a box seat, was injured in rush by people outside her box to
recover a foul ball); but see Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 2d 484,
222 P.2d 19 (1950) (assumed risk was held to apply where plaintiff sat in unscreened
portion of stadium and was struck by a ball some hour or so after the game had begun);
Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co., 325 Mass. 419, 90 N.E.2d 840 (1950)
(assumed risk was held to apply where plaintiff, who was familiar with the sport, was struck
by a batted ball while seated in an unscreened portion of the stadium) ; Emhardt v. Perry
Stadium, Inc., 113 Ind. App. 197, 46 N.E.2d 704 (1943) (assumed risk was held to apply
where another spectator attempted to throw a baseball back onto the field and struck the
plaintiff). The same inquiry must be made in cases involving injuries to a participant, see
Shahinian v. McCormick, 30 Cal. Rptr. 521, 381 P.2d 377 (1963) (water skier assumed
risk of falling but not that the boat would double back and run over him).
152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953).
60 258 S.W.2d at 64. See also San Antonio Portland Cement Co. v. Chandler, 360 S.W.2d
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e. (plaintiff knew about one moving crane but
did not know about a second crane which struck him).
61 Wesson v. Gillespie, 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964). See also cases cited note 55 supra;
and see Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting From Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U.
PA. L. Ruv. 629 (1952).
" Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952); contra, McConville v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
" See note 61 supra.
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open and obvious. It is the writer's opinion that the danger must be
so obvious that anyone could recognize and appreciate it as a danger,
i.e., so plain that any fool could plainly see. While there may be
issues of fact as to the size or other physical facts with regard to the
defect, whether the danger is open and obvious is a question of law,
and not a question of fact for the jury."
As previously mentioned, the number of times the plaintiff has
been exposed to the risk is another important factor in the determina-
tion. Where there has been no previous exposure and the defect is not
open and obvious, the plaintiff will not be charged with knowledge or
appreciation of the danger. " However the same result generally does
not follow if the plaintiff has repeatedly been exposed to the danger. 7
In Wesson v. Gillespie' a lady plaintiff tripped over a threshhold
going out of a tavern. She was a regular customer and had been in
and out of the tavern from three to five times a week for about five
years. She tripped during her fourth exposure that same night. It was
held that her repeated exposure to the danger was sufficient to charge
her with knowledge and appreciation of the danger.
D. Conditions v. Activities
A final item to consider is the source of the danger. This consid-
eration primarily involves distinguishing between static conditions on
the premises and activities. While it has not been determinative as
such, the question of whether the danger involved was a static condi-
tion or an activity has made a difference in the holdings of the Texas
courts. 9 Generally speaking, full knowledge and appreciation of the
risks involved in a static condition on the premises are more easily
acquired. For example, the dangerous nature of a hole or pit or of a
broken stairway is generally known and easily appreciated. One
merely needs to observe or be informed of the condition to acquire
knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved. On the other
hand, it is more difficult to acquire full knowledge and appreciation
of risks involving activities.
In any event, our court has been reluctant to apply the assumed
64 Halepeska, 371 S.W.2d at 378. See also Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR
L. REV. 111, 118 (1964).
65 371 S.W.2d at 382. See also Greenhill, note 64 supra, at 118.
'
6 Hall v. Medical Bldg. of Houston, 151 Tex. 425, 251 S.W.2d 497 (1952) (no previous
exposure to door opening from stair well into lobby).
67Houston National Bank v. Adair, 146 Tex. 387, 207 S.W.2d 374 (1948) (plaintiff
had been on worn stairs a number of times).
68 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964).
69 Analyzing the cases discloses that the no dity concept is generally applied to static
conditions on the premises while the volenti cases generally involve activities. See the cases
listed in Greenhill, note 64 supra, at 123-24.
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1
risk doctrine to cases involving activities."0 Generally these cases are
tried instead on negligence and contributory negligence issues. In
Halepeska the court had the opportunity to limit assumed risk to
static or inert conditions on the premises but declined to do so. How-
ever, in a subsequent opinion, the application of assumed risk prin-
ciples to activities was limited to those activities which are rigidly
circumscribed and easily predictable. 1
IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSUMED RISK OFF PREMISES
In Texas assumption of risk off the premises is termed volenti non
fit injuria as distinguished from no duty. The basis for this defense
is consent, actual or implied. Actual consent, of course, presents no
problems, but implied consent does. Consent is implied in varying
degrees in different jurisdictions. In the early cases it was implied
70See, e.g., Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Holloway, 378 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) error ref. n.r.e. (employee of cotton gin pushed a bale of cotton off a loading plat-
form onto plaintiff); American Cooperage Co., Inc. v. Clemons, 364 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e. (city employee fell from elevated traffic signal tower when
truck ran into wire support); San Antonio Portland Cement Co. v. Chandler, 360 S.W.2d
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e. (plaintiff struck by moving crane); Brock v.
Worth Const. Co., 344 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e. (plaintiff in-
jured in automobile collision at obviously dangerous intersection); and Fabens Ice Co. v.
Kosinski, 339 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e. (plaintiff struck in the
face by block of ice or ice tongs).
" Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1963). That case involved an invitee
who was backed over by a truck while on the defendant's premises. The court held that the
particular activity was not open and obvious and that assumed risk did not apply. For other
examples see McElhenny v. Thielepape, 155 Tex. 319, 285 S.W.2d 940 (1962) (rocking
chair type swing in doctor's office was rigidly circumscribed activity); and Cerboskas v.
Farris, 391 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. (fact that plaintiff's car,
while pushing defendant's stalled car, would swerve to the left into oncoming traffic was
not easily predictable). Perhaps, in order to sum up this area, mention should be made of
two writ of error applications which recently came before the court. Eagle Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc. v. Hazlewood, 391 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e., involved injury
to a plaintiff who had gone to the defendant company to look at a new automobile. Close
to the side of a car which the defendant's salesman was showing the plaintiff was an open
grease pit. The plaintiff saw the pit and knew it was there. He nevertheless stepped into the
pit and was injured. One of the plaintiff's arguments was that he momentarily forgot, that
he became entranced with the "sales pitch," and that such forgetfulness obliterated his
knowledge and appreciation. By refusal of the application for writ of error (with the nota-
tion no reversible error) the court approved the holding that the plaintiff was barred from
recovery because of his actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger. Another situation
arose in Liebman v. Tidelands Motor Inn, 391 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) writ
granted. In that case the plaintiff, a guest at the Tidelands Motor Inn, was injured when
he walked through a clear glass sliding door. He knew the door was there; he had been
through it several times, but in the daytime. At this particular time, however, he went out at
night, and his wife shut the door. He walked back into the glass and was injured. The jury
found a defective design and construction of the glass door in that, if closed, it could not be
seen in the dark. The plaintiff had actual knowledge of the design and knew how the door
worked. What he did not know was that his wife had closed the transparent door. The court
of civil appeals held that plaintiff's knowledge did not preclude recovery. Analogizing the
case to Wesson v. Gillespie, 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964), and to A. C. Burton v. Stasny,
223 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref., it was argued that the plaintiff had been
exposed to the construction and knew that the door would slide shut and open. However, it
was also argued that plaintiff did not know of the particular defect. At any rate, the case
raises many interesting questions.
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that as part of the contract of employment the employee was charged
with knowledge of dangers found on the job. Either he was bound to
know of the ordinary risks involved or he had agreed to assume them,
including those arising from the negligence of fellow servants." He
did not however assume hidden or unexpected dangers. The test then
was objective, i.e., the employee bore the risks of dangers of which he
should have known. As previously mentioned,73 the English view
developed to require that the plaintiff fully appreciate the particular
risk. In this sense, knowledge that some risk is involved is not enough;
there must be a voluntary encounter by one fully cognizant of the
nature and extent of the danger. The Canadian view has developed
such a strictness that it requires a finding of an actual or implied bar-
gain between the parties (not limited to the employer-employee rela-
tionship) whereby the injured party agreed in advance to give up his
cause of action against the offending party." For example, Lehnert
v. Stein' involved a suit by a passenger against a drunk driver. The
court held that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the
plaintiff expressly or by necessary implication agreed to exempt the
defendant from liability for damages. The defendant's only defense
then, absent a showing of an agreement, was contributory negligence.
The general American view is substantially more liberal than
either the English or Canadian view. Basically, it depends upon a vol-
untary assumption of a known and appreciated risk. The defense
consists of four elements, and the plaintiff will be held to have
assumed the risk when they are shown. The elements are that the
plaintiff (1) had knowledge of the existence of the conditions,
(2) had actual knowledge or is charged with knowledge of the dan-
ger (some jurisdictions still use the should have known test), (3)
appreciated (understood) the nature and extent of the risk, and
(4) voluntarily exposed himself to the risk. The final element is not
necessary in no duty cases because if there is no duty owed to the
plaintiff, he cannot create a duty by voluntarily exposing himself to
a known and appreciated risk."'
72150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
732 All E.R. 1 (1951).
74See WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 296 (1951), where
the author points out that "[T]he scope of the defence [volenti non fit injuria] has been
progressively curtailed since the end of the last century, so that at the present day it is
allowed only where there is a positive agreement waiving the right of action." See further
at page 308 where it is said, "To put this in general terms the defence of volens does not
apply where as the result of a mental process the plaintiff decides to take a chance but there
is nothing in his conduct to show a waiver of the right of action communicated to the
other party. To constitute a defence, there must have been an express or implied bargain
between the parties whereby the plaintiff gave up his right of action for negligence."
7336 D.L.R. 159 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1962) (riding with a drunken driver).
7'371 S.W.2d at 380.
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As mentioned, under some conditions, the plaintiff has been
charged with appreciation as well as knowledge of the danger. An
example in Texas is Schiller v. Rice, " which involved an injury to a
plaintiff who was riding with a driver known to be intoxicated. The
court held that since the plaintiff knew that the driver was drunk,
she would be charged with appreciation of the danger. There is
authority to the contrary in Canada"9 and Wisconsin." These juris-
dictions would approach the problem from the context of contribu-
tory negligence and not assumed risk.
V. How DOES ASSUMED RISK DIFFER FROM
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?
Basically, a plaintiff is contributorily negligent if his conduct cre-
ates an unreasonable risk of harm to himself, or if his activities fall
below the reasonable standard required of him for his own protec-
tion."
There are three fundamental distinctions which can be drawn
between assumed risk and contributory negligence."1 First, presence
or absence of justification on the part of the plaintiff, the crux of
contributory negligence, is ordinarily not important in assumed
risk." Thus, a person may justifiably and prudently assume a risk of
which he has knowledge or warning and still be denied a recovery.
Perhaps the most extreme example of the indecisiveness of justifica-
tion in assumed risk cases is Grover v. Owens." In that case the lady
plaintiff who had paid to attend a professional wrestling match
slipped in a restroom. There was water on the floor of the restroom,
and she knew of the messy conditions. However, she felt compelled to
"151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952).
"836 D.L.R. 159 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1962).
"gMcConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962) (riding with a drunken driver).
8"McFall v. Fletcher, 138 Tex. 93, 157 S.W.2d 131 (1941) (horse-drawn wagon with-
out reflectors was struck from behind by automobile at night); Martin v. Texas & P. Ry.
Co., 87 Tex. 117, 26 S.W. 1052 (1894) (plaintiff placed load of combustible cotton on
platform near railroad track); Cannady v. Dallas Ry. & Term. Co., 219 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) (plaintiff failed to keep proper lookout before entering intersection). See
also Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1908); PROSSER, TORTS
426-37 (3d ed. 1964); and RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS 504 (1965).
" A fourth distinction has been suggested, i.e., contributory negligence is based on care-
lessness and assumed risk on venturousness. In this regard, see Robbins v. Milner Enterprises,
Inc., 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960) (driving an automobile with defective brakes); Porter
v. Toledo Term. Ry. Co., 152 Ohio St. 463, 90 N.E.2d 142 (1950) (riding a bicycle over
a rough railroad crossing).
92Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964) (jury finding
that plaintiff was not negligent in failing to heed warning); Robert E. McKee, General
Contractor, Inc. v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954) (economic compulsion
in that the plaintiff was hired to complete construction of the bleachers).
sa 3 5 3 P.2d 254 (Ore. 1960).
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incur the risk for her own comfort and well being. While the per-
sonal necessity or justification for her being in the restroom was
unquestioned the Oregon Supreme Court held that she voluntarily
incurred a known and appreciated risk and could not recover.
Recently some exceptions and limitations to this general rule have
been considered. For example, the volenti doctrine, particularly as to
business invitees in areas where the public is invited, is being chal-
lenged. Moreover, an exception has been considered in cases where
the plaintiff was acting to rescue others from a risk negligently cre-
ated by the defendant. Finally, there has been the development of
the hard choice limitation. This limitation, simply stated, is that if
the defendant's negligence imposes a hard choice between exposure
and nonexposure to a danger created by him, and taking the risk
created by him seems the lesser of the two evils, the defendant should
not be relieved of liability. For example, suppose a young lady goes
on a date with a man who starts drinking after she gets in the car.
He gives her the opportunity to get out on a lonely road or in a bad
neighborhood, or the opportunity to be driven to her home by him in
a drunken condition. A good case can be made that she does not vol-
untarily assume the risk by not getting out and that her conduct
should be judged on the basis of contributory negligence.
A second fundamental difference between contributory negli-
gence and assumed risk is that proximate cause in its technical sense,
embodying the element of foreseeability, is an element of the former
but not of the latter. 4 Actual cause would be a more nearly accurate
description of the causal connection necessary to establish assumed
risk.
The third basic distinction lies in the test of the plaintiff's con-
duct."5 In contributory negligence the test is an objective one, i.e.,
whether the plaintiff acted as would an ordinary prudent person-
whether in the exercise of ordinary care he should have known of the
danger. With assumed risk, the test is now a subjective one, i.e.,
whether the particular plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk.
VI. PLEADINGS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Any analysis of the procedural aspects of assumed risk requires
84 Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941) (plaintiff in-
jured in fall from raised platform at soda fountain); Ft. Worth & Dallas Ry. Co. v. Bar-
low, 263 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e. (collision between train and
truck at railroad crossing). See also Annot., Distinction Between Assumption of Risk and
Contributory Negligence, 82 A.L.R. 2d 1218 (1962).
85 Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex. 1963). See also
PROSSER, TORTS 462 (3d ed. 1964); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 574-75 (1965).
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a rather timorous approach because our court has not decided many
of the points which can be involved. " Possible differences of opinion
among the members of the court might exist on almost any point,
and so by design, no sweeping statements or conclusions will be
attempted. Generally, however, in volenti situations the burden of
pleading, proof and submission of issues is upon the defendant."7
It is clearly a matter of defense. However, in the "no duty" situation
about all that has been established is that "no duty" is a part of the
plaintiff's case since the plaintiff must show a duty on defendant's
part and a breach of that duty."8 The issue is raised by a general
denial.
A primary difficulty remaining in Texas concerns the burden of
requesting special issues in the "no duty" situation. The Halepseka
case discussed the special issues necessary to establish assumed risk."'
Special issues concerning the adequacy of a warning are touched upon
in Western Auto Supply Co. v. Campbell." Questions regarding whose
duty it is to request the submission of special issues and the legal effect
of a request for a part of a cluster of issues on assumed risk were
deliberately raised but not answered in Wesson v. Gillespie."
VII. SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE
FUTURE OF ASSUMED RISK
A. Trends-Perhaps
Any attempt to determine a trend in the assumed risk area is diffi-
cult. The number of possible trends seems to be roughly equivalent to
the number of jurisdictions contributing to the area. However, some
movement can be discerned in the morass of case law.
A few states have abolished the doctrine of assumed risk in favor
of contributory negligence. The New Jersey court, in McGrath v.
American Cyanamid Co.," recently stated: "experience . . . indicates
the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mist that it is better
banished from the scene. We hope we have heard the last of it. Hence-
forth let us stay with 'negligence' and 'contributory negligence.' ""
8"Such is not the case in all jurisdictions, however. For example, art 23, § 6 of the
Oklahoma Constitution provides, "The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption
of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left
to the jury." See also Note, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 348 (1964).
8See Halepeska, 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963), and authorities cited note 7 supra.
68 Ibid.
"6371 S.W.2d at 381.
s0 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964).
91382 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Tex. 1964).
"196 A.2d 238 (1963).
'3 Id. at 240-41.
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The doctrine has been abolished in automobile cases involving
guests"4 and in cases where the master was negligent in creating or
maintaining the dangerous conditions.' However, in a few states, the
doctrine continues to apply to the master and servant relationship."9
In the other direction, the current view of the American Law
Institute is to retain the doctrine of assumed risk. Before that action
was taken, however, there was a serious attack on the doctrine by
some of our most astute legal scholars. In this regard, the extremely
interesting and enlightening commentaries, called the "Battle of the
Wilderness," are recommended. 7 The draft contains writings by
Prosser, Seavey, Malone, Eldridge, et al., on whether assumed risk
should or should not be retained as an independent concept. After a
prolonged controversy, assumed risk survived.
B. Wbere Is Assumed Risk Going?
While it is dangerous to attempt to forecast where assumed risk is
going or how it is developing, there are certain areas where the doc-
trine may be limited in various jurisdictions. There probably will be
a more stringent requirement that the plaintiff "actually knew and
appreciated" the particular danger. A corollary will be the decrease
in the number of cases in which the plaintiff is charged with knowl-
edge or appreciation, or both. As to invitees, there probably will be
an enlargement of the class of people regarded as business invitees.
This should lead to a corresponding extension of duty to persons,
especially children, accompanying the invitee. The general tendency
to remove people from the "bare licensee" category will also probably
continue to receive support.
There will probably be a relaxation of the rule that a person in-
jured in a store or other place where the public is invited cannot re-
cover if he knows of or is warned of some defects, depending upon
his justification for proceeding through the store. We may even see,
in some jurisdictions, the complete abolition of the no duty doctrine
as applied to business guests." The tendency probably will be to re-
quire safe conditions, with the test of plaintiff's conduct being
judged on the basis of contributory negligence.
In some jurisdictions, emphasis will probably be placed on requir-
"McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
9S Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962).
go Felgner v. Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1965) (returning the doctrine of
assumed risk to the master and servant relationship); Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 192 F.2d 615
(10th Cir. 1951) (limiting the doctrine of assumed risk to the master and servant rela-
tionship).
"
T RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 560-81 (1965).
"See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 192 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1951).
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ing an approximation to actual consent to the injury or to the expo-
sure to the risk. Canada presently requires a finding of a contract to
give up the cause of action. A distinct possibility exists of the
expansion of the requirement of voluntary exposure, i.e., where de-
fendant has put plaintiff to a hard choice, some courts may say that
the plaintiff did not voluntarily accept the risk. A good example,
previously mentioned, involves a drunk driver, dark night, bad
weather, female passenger on a dark road or in a rough part of town.
Another example is the mother who enters a store with a slick floor
to get medicine or food.9" Or another example, previously mentioned,
involves the lady who needs to use the restroom at the professional
wrestling match. The element of justification for taking the risk is
getting more attention.
Another area where the doctrine may be limited involves the pos-
sible enlargement of the rescue exception in assumed risk cases."° At
early common law, each man was expected to look out for himself,
a stern individualism. To help someone else in an emergency was an
extravagance which the helper indulged in at his own risk and ex-
pense. Today, however, where the defendant has created a dangrous
situation to which another naturally and understandably responds,
and is reasonably justified in acting, there is a more charitable atti-
tude toward the rescuer. The tendency is more toward holding the
person causing the danger liable, testing the rescuer's actions by con-
tributory negligence.
A final area of limitation may be with respect to the warning
theory."' While the concept of a warning as negativing the duty of
the owner-occupier is being retained, there will probably be a grow-
ing tendency to require a complete disclosure of the dangerous con-
ditions involved.
99 At the present time the court has an opportunity to consider this problem. We have
an application for writ of error pending in the case of Gulfway General Hospital v. Pursley,
397 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). That case involves an injury to a plaintiff when
she slipped and fell on snow and ice while trying to get medical attention.
... Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Winder, 340 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref.
"' At present in a majority of jurisdictions, communication of a warning as to the
danger discharges the owner-occupier's duty or causes the invitee to accept the risk. However,
this rule has received much criticism, particularly with regard to business invitees. See 2
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1494 (1956). As a consequence, there should be an increasing
number of cases where the warning will not be sufficient because there was not a full dis-
closure and the invitee did not fully appreciate the danger. Also, depending on the justifica-
tion, a simple warning will not discharge the duty. The duty will be to protect, and pro-
ceeding notwithstanding the warning will be considered under contributory negligence.
[Vol. 20:1
